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Motivation
“To be the best bank in a system failure is to have a presidential
suite on the Titanic” (anonymous banker, Davos Forum)
Marking-to-market systemic risk is relevant for financial
regulation and risk management
A recognized regulation principle is that a systemic shock
independent of shocks to the components of the financial
system should be insured by the community at large, while
a systemic shock triggered by the elements of the system
should be insured by them (SIFI regulation)
Large financial institutions have set trading desks that take
the responsibility of buying insurance against extreme
scenarios, particularly including systemic risk (called
“overhead hedging” or “tail hedging”).
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Systemic credit risk transfer
Assume we want to buy and sell protection on a systemic credit
risk event, defined as the the event that brings about the
simultaneous default of all the obligor.
Then, we have two problems:
Mark-to-market the systemic credit derivative
Hedge the price change of the derivative through time
Here we provide a model that can be estimated, validated and
used to mark-to-market this derivative, both in a pure systemic
setting and with the presence of contagion. The model will also
provide inside on the hedging strategy.
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Contagion and systemic risk in the literature
Contagion and systemic risk are not very well distinguished in the
literature:
1 Granger causality, and related concepts (Billio et al.,2012).
2 Network representation of the relationships among financial
institutions (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2011, Bargigli et al., 2015)
3 Copulas and conditional risk measures (Acharya et al., 2010,
Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011, Cherubini and Mulinacci 2014)
In our study we use the default probabilities extracted from CDS and
their dependence structure in order to back out the probability of a
systemic event. The systemic event here is defined as the
simultaneous default of all the obligors in the system (as in the Titanic
example)
U. Cherubini Marking to Market Systemic Risk: Application to the European Banking System
Motivation and background
The model
Data Analysis
The bivariate Marshall-Olkin distribution
X0
↙ ↘
X1 X2
τ1 = min{X0,X1} τ1 = min{X0,X2}
with X0,X1,X2
independent
exponentially distributed: F¯Xi (t) = P(Xi > t) = e−λi t , λi > 0,
t > 0.
Then
P(τ1 > t1, τ2 > t2) = F¯τ1,τ2 (t1, t2) =
= P(X0 > max{t1, t2},X1 > t1,X2 > t2) =
= exp(−λ0 max{t1, t2} − λ1t1 − λ2t2)
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Marginal survival distributions:
F¯τ1(t1) = e
−(λ1+λ0)t1 F¯τ2(t2) = e
−(λ2+λ0)t2
τ1 and τ2 are no more independent
WHAT KIND OF DEPENDENCE?
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Definition of Copula
Definition
For every d ≥ 2, a d-dimensional copula (shortly, a d-copula) is
a d-dimensional distribution function whose univariate
marginals are uniformly distributed on [0,1].
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Sklar’s Theorem
Sklar, 1959
Let (Y1, . . . ,Yd) be a r.v. with joint d.f. F and univariate
marginals F1,F2, . . . ,Fd . Then there exists a d.f.
C : [0,1]d → [0,1], called d-copula, such that, for all y ∈ Rd ,
F (y1, y2, . . . , yd) = C(F1(y1),F2(y2), . . . ,Fd(yd)).
C is uniquely determined on Range(F1)× · · · ×Range(Fd) and,
hence, it is unique when F1, . . . ,Fd are continuous.
Every known multivariate d.f. is associated with a copula
The copula C associated with a joint d.f. F is given by
C(u1, . . . ,ud) = F (F←1 (u1), . . . ,F
←
d (ud)).
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The Marshall-Olkin copula
Applying Sklar’s Theorem to the MO distribution
C(u, v) = u
λ1
λ1+λ0 v
λ2
λ2+λ0 min{u
λ0
λ1+λ0 , v
λ0
λ2+λ0 } =
= min
{
u1−
λ0
λ1+λ0 v ,uv1−
λ0
λ2+λ0
}
Setting
α =
λ0
λ1 + λ0
, β =
λ0
λ2 + λ0
The Marshall-Olkin copula
Cα,β(u, v) = min
{
u1−αv ,uv1−β
}
, α, β ∈ [0,1]
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Extensions of the Marshall-Olkin distribution
Multivariate: Marshall and Olkin (1967)
Any marginal distribution: Li & Pellerey (2011), Lin & Li
(2014)
Dependence among original shocks: Li (2009), Bernhart et
al. (2010) and Mai et al. (2013)
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Curse of dimension
For high dimensions the Marshall-Olkin model becomes very
soon untractable. Two different kinds of solutions have been
provided:
Exchangeable model: same default probability for every
shock triggering k defaults, k = 1,2, . . . ,d , TUM school
Cluster specification: the obligors are previously gathered
in clusters exposed to the same common shock, our
approach
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Model assumptions
Our model is made tractable by two assumptions
Assumption 1
The joint survival distribution of the shocks’ vector is, for
(x0, x1, . . . , xd) ∈ [0,+∞)d+1,
F¯ (x0, x1, . . . , xd) = ψ
(
d∑
i=0
λiH(xi)
)
(1)
where ψ : [0,+∞)→ [0,1] is the Laplace transform of a
positive random variable and H : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) is a strictly
increasing function with H(0) = 0 and λi > 0, for i = 0,1, . . .d
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Assumption 2
Default times are marginally exponentially distributed
F¯Tk (x) = exp(−µkx), k = 1, . . . ,d (2)
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Observed default time dependence
Proposition
Under Assumption 1. the survival copula function of
T = (T1, . . . ,Td) is
Cˆ(u1, . . . ,ud) = ψ
(
max
1≤k≤d
{
αkψ
−1(uk )
}
+
d∑
k=1
(1− αk )ψ−1(uk )
)
(3)
where
αk =
λ0
λ0 + λk
∈ (0,1). (4)
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The GMO distribution
Proposition
Under Assumptions 1. and 2. where f : (0,+∞)2 → (+∞) is a
differentiable function, strictly increasing with respect to the second
argument, the joint survival distribution function of the random vector
T = (T1,T2, . . . ,Td ) is, for t1, . . . , td ∈ [0,+∞)d , of type
F¯T(t1, . . . , td ) = exp
−
(
λ0
(
max
1≤i≤d
{ti}
)θ
+
d∑
k=1
λk tθk
) 1
θ
 (5)
where θ ≥ 1. As a consequence, the marginal survival functions are
exponentially distributed with intensity
µk = f (λ0, λk ) = (λ0 + λk )
1
θ , (6)
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The dependence structure of the GMO model
Proposition
Under Assumptions 1. and 2. the copula function associated
to the survival distribution of the random vector
T = (T1,T2, . . . ,Td) is
Cˆ(u) = exp
−
(
max
1≤k≤d
{
αk (− loguk )θ
}
+
d∑
k=1
(1− αk ) (− loguk )θ
) 1
θ

(7)
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The dependence structure of the GMO model
Proposition
The Kendall’s τ association measure between each random
pair (Ti ,Tk ) is
τj,k =
θ − 1
θ
+
τMOj,k
θ
(8)
where
τMOj,k =
αjαk
αj + αk − αjαk
is the Kendall’s tau of the Marshall-Olkin copula. Moreover, the
Kendall’s tau τj,0 of the pair (Tj ,X0) is
τ0,j =
θ − 1
θ
+
αj
θ
(9)
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A credit derivative on simultaneous events
The model provides a straightforward tool to back-out the
intensity of the systemic shock from observed marginal
intensities:
λ
1/θ
0 = α¯
1/θ ·
(∑d
k=1 µ
θ
k
d
)1/θ
(10)
where α¯ = d∑d
k=1
1
αk
is the harmonic mean of the αk ’s.
In a pure systemic risk setting, the value of the systemic
credit derivative is proportional to the credit index (such as
iTraxx, CDX,...)
The presence of contagion includes a downward bias in
the systemic credit derivative
U. Cherubini Marking to Market Systemic Risk: Application to the European Banking System
Motivation and background
The model
Data Analysis
A first-to-default swap
From the joint survival distribution for a given time t :
F¯ (t) = F¯T(t , . . . , t) one immediately gets that the first-to-default
time is also exponentially distributed with intensity:
λFTD = λ
1
θ
0
[
1 + d
(
1
α¯
− 1
)] 1
θ
and in case of pure systemic risk (θ = 1)
CDSFTD = I¯ (α¯ + d(1− α¯))
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A credit derivative on the systemic shock being first
This contract would pay a sum of money if all the obligors in the
cluster default at the same time, while it will expire worthless if
at least one of the obligors defaults for idiosyncratic reasons.
The value of this protection turns out to be proportional to the
first-to-default
P(T1 = · · · = Td ≤ t) = λ0
λθFTD
(
1− e−λFTD t
)
Notice that the occurrence of simultaneous default is captured
by the ratio
γ =
λ0
λθFTD
=
1
1 + d
( 1
α¯ − 1
)
that represents the probability that sooner or later the obligors
will fail together, because of the systemic shock.
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Data details
Baglioni and Cherubini (2013) dataset of European banks
We estimated the model for 8 European countries, during
the crisis (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, France, Germany,
Netherlands, UK).
The dataset included 35 banks
The dataset of 5 years CDS quotes starts from January
2007 and ends in August 2012.
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Estimation strategy
The estimation strategy consists of
Estimation of the αk and θ parameters
Extraction of a time series of systemic risk intensities
Computation of the Kendall τ statistics between each
default observed default time and the occurrence time of a
systemic shock
Visual comparison of the estimated Kendall τ ’s and the
theoretical one
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Data and estimation
The survival probabilities were extracted from the 5 year CDS
quotes
For each country, the d + 1 parameters
Θ = {α1, α2, . . . , αd , θ}
where estimated by
Θˆ = argmin
{α1,α2,...,αd ,θ}
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=i+1
d(τi,j , τˆi,j)
where
d(x , y) is a suitable distance measure,
τˆi,j = τi,j(αi , αj , θ) is the theoretical Kendall’s tau
τi,j is the corresponding empirical Kendall’s tau.
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Cases in which the model provides a good fit
Figure : Kendall’s tau between default times and systemic shock
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Cases in which the model does not provide a good fit
Figure : Kendall’s tau between default times and systemic shock
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The dynamics of the contagion parameter.
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Hedging systemic credit default swaps
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A contagion index
The bias induced by contagion in the measurement of systemic
risk, may be very relevant. This bias may be used to define a
“contagion index” as
Ic =
LGDλ1/θ0 − α¯I¯
LGD max
k=1,...d
µk − α¯I¯
Notice that maxµk is the limiting value of λ
1/θ
0 when θ → +∞.
U. Cherubini Marking to Market Systemic Risk: Application to the European Banking System
Motivation and background
The model
Data Analysis
Contagion index dynamics
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Conclusions
We provide a model with non-observable idiosyncratic and
systemic default risk components, Archimedean
dependence of the occurrence times of the shocks,
exponential marginal intensities of observed default times
The model can be estimated by method of moments and
can be easily validated by visual inspection
The model allows to back out the intensity of the systemic
shock and to mark-to-market, the value of a systemic credit
derivative contract, for the transfer of systemic credit risk.
We propose two systemic credit derivative, the first paying
protection if SOME obligors default together and the
second if ALL the obligors default together.
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Conclusions
In the case of pure systemic credit risk (i.e. independent
unobserved shocks), the value of the systemic credit
derivative is proportional to the credit index, with the
proportionality factor equal to the harmonic mean of the
Marshall-Olkin copula parameters of the system. The
credit derivative written on the event that the common
shock takes place first is instead proportional to the FTD
swap. Both the systemic credit derivatives can be statically
hedged with the credit index.
The presence of contagion induces a bias in the pure
systemic credit risk index, so that the statistical hedging of
the financial product requires a dynamic adjustment: we
show that using an EWMA hedge with the credit index
provides satisfactory results.
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Conclusions
The next extension is to drop the assumption of
exchangeable dependence among the non-observed
components (i.e. some θ value for all the obligors).
A more involved extension would be to allow for double
stochastic marginal distributions.
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